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ARE MORAL ERROR THEORISTS 
INTELLECTUALLY VICIOUS?
Stephen Ingram
harging other people with intellectual vice is an important part of 
human life. One journalist might accuse another of being a narrow-mind-
ed conspiracy theorist, for example, or a lecturer might accuse her stu-
dent of being intellectually lazy when he once again fails to do the required read-
ing. We make “epistemic vice-charges,” as Kidd calls them, for various reasons.1 
Ideally, they can improve our dialectical situation by identifying, explaining, 
evaluating, and correcting bad epistemic activity. Less nobly, they can be used 
to stain a rival’s reputation, or to make laypersons doubt an expert’s testimo-
ny. Kidd distinguishes robust and rhetorical vice-charges.2 In rhetorical cases, 
one agent negatively evaluates another but cannot “elaborate or ‘unpack’ the 
charge . . . by explaining the reasoning that supports the negative judgment.”3 A 
rhetorical charge lacks epistemic force. Even if it is widely endorsed, without 
evidence to back it up it is indistinguishable from arbitrary name calling, and 
thus cannot advance a debate in an epistemically admissible way. But if a charge 
receives adequate evidential support it becomes robust, has real dialectical force, 
and can play a role in epistemic life. 
Kyriacou suggests that we might need to issue an epistemic vice-charge 
against moral error theorists.4 He says this in response to an objection I make 
against the “moral fixed points view” defended by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau.5 
This paper replies to Kyriacou. I show that there is little hope of making his vice-
charge robust enough to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I begin with a 
brief overview of the debate. I then develop Kyriacou’s charge, before arguing 
that it fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view.
1 Kidd, “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice.”
2 Kidd, “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice,” 183–84.
3 Kidd, “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice,” 183.
4 Kyriacou, “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram.”
5 Ingram, “The Moral Fixed Points”; Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, “The Moral Fixed Points.”
C
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1. Background
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau recommend that moral non-naturalists accept the 
following:
There are non-natural moral truths. These truths include the moral fixed 
points, which are a species of conceptual truth, as they are propositions 
that are true in virtue of the essences of their constituent concepts.6
A representative example of a moral fixed point (MFP) is the following:
A: It is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau suggest that the essences of the concepts WRONG and 
RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER OF A FELLOW PERSON are such that, when some-
thing satisfies the latter concept, it also satisfies the former.
I discuss putative attractions of this view below, but note first that it has the 
following entailment: anyone who denies an MFP is not just morally mistaken, but 
conceptually deficient. This includes error theorists, who hold that all of moral 
discourse is in error. Of course, to say that error theorists are conceptually defi-
cient is not to say that they are metaethically flat-footed. Cuneo and Shafer-Lan-
dau make the subtler and more charitable claim that error theorists are misled as 
to what is implied by the content of their moral concepts. What misleads them, 
according to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, is a suspect methodology. Specifically, 
one that involves “rejecting highly evident first-order moral propositions . . . on 
the basis of either highly controversial metaethical claims, or speculative em-
pirical claims.”7 This supposedly underwrites the claim that error theorists are 
conceptually deficient. Not everyone is convinced, however. In earlier work I 
have argued that, when we examine the error theorist’s method carefully, it is not 
clear what exactly is wrong with it.8
More specifically, I argued that the error theorist uses a standard philosophi-
cal methodology—roughly, a four-stage process of theory development:
(1) Get your intuitions in order. Scrutinise them, make them cohere, etc.
(2) Develop a theory that, if true, vindicates your intuitions. Test it against 
standard criteria. If it passes, accept the theory. If it fails, move to (3).
6 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, “The Moral Fixed Points,” 411–12.
7 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, “The Moral Fixed Points,” 438.
8 Ingram, “The Moral Fixed Points,” 4.
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(3) Revise your theory. If it still fails after you have considered all avail-
able revisions, move to (4).
(4) Accept that your intuitions were in error, and explain this error.
My suggestion was that error theorists operate in this familiar and apparently 
legitimate way. So, even if error theory is false, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau cannot 
ascribe conceptual deficiency to error theorists on the basis that they are misled 
by their method. Kyriacou, however, thinks that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view 
can be improved. 
2. Kyriacou’s Vice-Charge
Kyriacou proposes diagnosing the conceptual deficiency within a virtue-theoretic 
framework. The central idea is that virtues can dispose us to mastery of moral 
concepts, while vices can dispose us to conceptual deficiency. One way to de-
velop this is to say that those who deny the MFPs do so because they are morally 
vicious. Their callous and sadistic character “induces some conceptual deficien-
cy and moral blindness.”9 But that line of thought will not wash—the error theo-
rists I know are lovely, not callous or sadistic at all. (Some of my best friends are 
error theorists!) For this sort of reason, Kyriacou suggests that error theorists do 
have an intuitive grasp of the MFPs when engaging in first-order moral thought.10 
However, at the second-order metaethical level, they resist recognizing them as 
conceptual truths.
So, strictly speaking, error theorists should be accused of meta-conceptual 
deficiency. Kyriacou holds that, to support this, we should argue that error the-
orists are “not sufficiently virtuous in the relevant intellectual respects.”11 He sub-
mits that error theorists are blinded by “a stubborn and narrow-minded insistence 
on the suspect philosophical methodology of strong reductionist naturalism 
that values ontological parsimony over and above the value of saving the phe-
nomena.”12 If this is right, it can underwrite the accusation of meta-conceptual 
deficiency. This would undercut my objection, vindicating the MFP view.
Kyriacou acknowledges that more work needs to be done to develop his 
suggested vice-charge. I do some of that work here, for it is necessary for the 
task of evaluating the prospects of making the charge robust. This matters, for if 
the charge remains rhetorical—that is, if it continues to lack adequate eviden-
9 Kyriacou, “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency,” 4.
10 Kyriacou, “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency,” 5.
11 Kyriacou, “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency,” 5.
12 Kyriacou, “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency,” 6, emphasis added.
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tial support—then it will possess no more epistemic force than arbitrary name 
calling. I focus on the charge of narrow-mindedness, for if error theorists are 
narrow-minded and stubborn then the latter is likely due to the former. I also 
read the charge charitably as targeting a “local” rather than a “global” vice.13 That 
is, instead of asking whether error theorists have a narrow-minded psychological 
profile in most or all (trait-relevant) contexts—something that would be very 
hard to establish—I instead evaluate the claim that they are narrow-minded in 
some relevantly localized range of contexts.
Indeed, what Kyriacou seems to have in mind are contexts relating to the 
methodology of “strong reductionist naturalism.” So, let us say that the local 
vice-charge is that error theorists are narrow-minded-about-naturalism. This is 
what explains their meta-conceptual deficiency. To see what this amounts to, 
consider what is involved in narrow-mindedness for any given domain.
On one influential view, open-mindedness involves being motivated to be 
“receptive to new ideas and arguments even when they conflict with one’s own 
in order to ultimately get knowledge.”14 Being “receptive” to such ideas involves 
being willing and able to examine them without prejudice, without letting parti-
san commitments undercut conscientious inquiry. Correspondingly, then, nar-
row-mindedness involves failure or refusal to explore ideas or arguments that 
conflict with one’s own, or else a prejudicial exploration of them. 
It is worth introducing a nuance here. Philosophers often use “narrow-mind-
ed” and “dogmatic” interchangeably, and this reflects part of ordinary discourse. 
But we often reserve “dogmatic” for an extreme form of narrow-mindedness 
seen in those who are fanatically devoted to a doctrine—those who fail to recep-
tively entertain rival ideas because they are in the grip of a worldview that seems 
unarguable to them. This fanaticism does not always apply to those we call nar-
row-minded. Those who find a view they like and fail to receptively entertain its 
rivals (where this is due to the fact that they already have a view they like) differ 
from those who are devoted to a worldview, and who are thus hostile to rival ideas, 
and attempt to repudiate them. 
For example, consider (1) a fascist who feels a need to burn books that es-
pouse rival ideas, and (2) someone who has no desire to view sources of news 
other than The Daily Mail because they like what they read there, but who also 
feels no deep loyalty to that paper and is indifferent to where others get their 
news. Both are narrow-minded, but in comparing them I am inclined to reserve 
the charge of “dogmatism” for (1). On this use of terms, which reflects part of 
ordinary language, dogmatism entails narrow-mindedness but not vice versa. In 
13 Cf. Doris, Lack of Character, 62–66.
14 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 269.
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short, in some contexts we reserve “dogmatic” for those who are unusually ded-
icated to a worldview.
I note this because it forces us to ask whether error theorists should be 
charged with dogmatic narrow-mindedness. I have never met a book-burning er-
ror theorist—even if they turn out to be dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-nat-
uralism, they will no doubt be at the milder end of the spectrum. But, whether or 
not they are dogmatic in this way, this is what the charge must be. 
To see this, note that their alleged epistemic misconduct is radical. They 
are accused of meta-conceptual deficiency—reflectively resisting conceptual 
truths that they intuitively grasp. If this is underwritten by some form of nar-
row-mindedness, it is the dogmatic form to which we must appeal, for this is 
what it takes to explain why error theorists endorse a theory that conflicts with 
their own intuitions. In theorizing they fail to receptively entertain their own ideas. 
It plausibly takes a deep dedication to naturalism to produce such cognitive 
dissonance. So, the charge should be that error theorists are dogmatically-nar-
row-minded-about-naturalism. This is what explains the meta-conceptual defi-
ciency involved in their denying the MFPs, and gives a way to defend Cuneo and 
Shafer-Landau against my earlier objection. With this charge on the table, we 
can now assess the prospects of making it robust rather than rhetorical. I suggest 
that the prospects are not good.
3. A Robust Charge?
3.1. Intellectual Misconduct
The first thing we have to do to get a robust charge is show that the intellectual 
misconduct that it is invoked to explain and evaluate really is intellectual mis-
conduct. After all, if the error theorist does not misbehave, there is no reason to 
make the charge—no dialectical role for it to play. 
Note that the misconduct here cannot just be that error theorists accept a 
theory that conflicts with their first-order intuitions. For if the theory is correct, 
and the intuitions in error, then this is the right thing to do. So, a robust charge 
will have to show that the putative MFPs really are MFPs, for if this can be reason-
ably rejected then it will be unclear that error theorists err in denying the MFPs, 
and thus that there is intellectual misconduct for the vice-charge to explain. 
We must therefore assess the MFP view’s plausibility. Cuneo and Shafer-Lan-
dau argue that it explains four facts about the claims that they have in mind as 
MFPs: (i) that such claims hold of necessity, (ii) that they fix the boundaries for 
what counts as a moral framework, (iii) that their denial incites bewilderment, 
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and (iv) that they are knowable a priori.15 If this is right, then we have reason 
to call the MFPs conceptual truths, and there is intellectual misconduct to ex-
plain. But the MFP claim is not the only available take on (i)–(iv). Evers and 
Streumer argue that the essences of WRONG and RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER OF 
A FELLOW PERSON do not make it a conceptual truth that
A: It is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person.
They suggest that it is only a conceptual truth that 
B: If anything is wrong, it is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter 
of a fellow person.16 
Evers and Streumer note that this suggests a different way of interpreting (i)–
(iv).17 For instance, if their view is correct, it is only on the condition that A is true 
that it is necessarily true, or knowable a priori. And maybe Olson is right that 
error theory is emotionally difficult to accept—this may be what makes it so 
bewildering and disturbing when the MFPs are denied.18 We might also propose 
that B fixes the boundaries for what can count as a moral framework.
The idea that error theorists err in denying the putative MFPs (and that there 
is thus misconduct to explain) thus relies on the MFP explanation of (i)–(iv) 
being superior to this rival. We must settle the debate in favor of the MFP ex-
planation before the charge can be seen as robust. However, to establish the su-
periority of the MFP explanation would effectively be to establish the MFP view, 
and whether this view is true is just what is at issue in this debate. So, one issue 
for defenders of the vice-charge is that they must find a dialectically appropriate 
way to establish the MFP view in order to show that there is some intellectual 
misconduct to explain. 
3.2. Cross-Situational Consistency
Another, more troubling problem arises from the fact that we can ask whether 
error theorists have the psychological profile involved in being dogmatically-nar-
row-minded-about-naturalism. The best evidence we are likely to get here would 
be their acting similarly viciously in a suitable range of contexts, for this would 
indicate a characterological root from which the behavior springs. If error theo-
rists are dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-naturalism, then it will be any context 
in which naturalism is at stake that is relevant. We can allow that error theorists 
15 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, “The Moral Fixed Points,” 407–8.
16 Evers and Streumer, “Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?”
17 Evers and Streumer, “Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?” 4n9.
18 Olson, Moral Error Theory, 143.
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might inquire virtuously when participating in a debate in which naturalism is 
not at stake, but the charge commits us to predicting that they are out to defend 
naturalism generally (or that, when they are forced to pick a side in a debate in 
which naturalism is at stake, they seek to defend it and repudiate its rivals). Thus, 
if the error theorist is dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-naturalism, we can ex-
pect them to have naturalistic views on the metaphysics of mind, mathematics, 
and logic, for they will fail to receptively entertain the idea that qualia, numbers, 
and identity (etc.) are non-natural. This is a localized prediction of “cross-situa-
tional consistency.” How plausible is it?
It is true that some moral error theorists have been out to defend naturalism 
generally. Mackie considers whether numbers and identity (etc.) can fit into his 
naturalistic picture, and says that we must “show how, on empiricist foundations, 
we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have 
of all these matters.”19 Of cases for which he had yet to give his own empiricist 
theory, he says: “I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of 
these can be given in empirical terms,” and that if any should “resist such treat-
ment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the 
targets of the argument from queerness.”20 Such remarks show little, however. 
They need not reflect failure to receptively entertain rival ideas, or some broader 
psychological profile.
And, besides, Mackie is just one man. The vice-charge targets error theorists 
as a group. Indeed, it has to do this in order to play the role that Kyriacou has in 
mind for it—namely, to vindicate the MFP view against my objection. I suggested 
that it is implausible that error theorists are conceptually deficient. Kyriacou re-
plied that they plausibly are meta-conceptually deficient, at least once we explain 
how this came to be using a vice-charge. If the charge is to play this dialectical 
role alone, it must apply to all who participate in the relevant intellectual miscon-
duct—to error theorists as a group. This is where issues emerge. There is no nec-
essary connection between (a) the idea that non-natural moral truths are queer 
and (b) an overarching naturalistic worldview.21 That is, even if most actual error 
theorists endorse naturalism, nothing about error theory forces them to do so. We 
can imagine someone who finds irreducible normativity queer and thus believes 
that error theory is true, but who also thinks that qualia are irreducibly non-nat-
ural. Maybe nobody has defended this combination of views, but it is easy to 
imagine someone doing so. Nothing about error theory excludes this possibility.
What might one say to explain the alleged meta-conceptual deficiency of this 
19 Mackie, Ethics, 39.
20 Mackie, Ethics, 39.
21 Cf. Olson, Moral Error Theory, 86. 
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person? A new explanation is needed, for they are engaged in the same activi-
ty as other error theorists, but not because they are dogmatically-narrow-mind-
ed-about-naturalism. We can be certain of this, for they forsake naturalistic views 
of qualia. An obvious reply is to further localize the charge. Instead of saying that 
error theorists are dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-naturalism, perhaps we 
could say that they are dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-metaethics. Someone 
with this vice can inquire viciously on metaethical issues, like the MFPs, without 
this having any bearing on their inquiry about qualia and such. But this does not 
help, for we can imagine error theorists who inquire virtuously in metaethical 
debates that do not bear on their chosen form of error theory. 
Consider someone who says that moral truths would have to be irreducibly 
normative, that irreducible normativity is queer, and that moral discourse is 
thus in error. This form of error theory is compatible with any view of moral 
motivation. Error theorists of this sort might inquire virtuously in debate over 
judgment internalism and externalism, for instance. So, the charge must localize 
further. And we can keep running this line until we reach the charge that er-
ror theorists are dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-moral-error-theory. But there 
are problems with such a narrow charge. First, it is uninformative. When the 
claim was that error theorists are dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-naturalism, 
we made interesting predictions about what they will do when their naturalistic 
worldview is at stake. We cannot say the same if the charge is that they are dog-
matically-narrow-minded-about-moral-error-theory. The prediction in this case 
will be that the moral error theorist will defend moral error theory if it is at stake, 
and that, if she is shown an argument against moral error theory, she will seek to 
reject one of its premises. This prediction is uninteresting; it is what we expect 
of error theorists whether or not they are vicious. 
Second, such a charge does not identify a vice. Local traits are one thing, but 
this charge is so narrow that the vice is not really an aspect of character. Doris 
does discuss hyper-local traits, but I agree with Cassam that “the sweet spot is 
somewhere between the mythical global traits which demand absolute consis-
tency and ultra-fine-grained, situation-specific local traits which carry no impli-
cations for a person’s conduct other than in a single case.”22 The original charge 
plausibly does lie in the sweet spot but has limited dialectical force. The revised 
charge (that they are dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-moral-error-theory) is 
too localized to pick out a real character trait—something that could play a use-
ful explanatory role.
A related issue with such a narrow charge is that it must be bolstered by a 
story of how the error theorist actually became dogmatically committed to error 
22 Doris, Lack of Character, 66; Cassam, “Vice Epistemology,” 174.
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theory. This is also true of the broader original charge, but getting a plausible 
story here is easy—for instance, we might say that error theorists are impressed 
(as many are) by the success of the natural sciences. But, having abandoned the 
original charge for the hyper-localized one, we must now ask how they came to 
this very specific vice-trait. And this is a harder task. Kyriacou suggests that the 
error theorist suffers from “theory-induced blindness.”23 This might explain why 
they have a hyper-localized vice of being dogmatically-narrow-minded-about-mor-
al-error-theory. However, not everyone with a theory also has theory-induced 
blindness, so we need to explain why this afflicts error theorists in particular. 
Otherwise the debate will descend into “an interminable exchange of charge and 
countercharge,” with error theorists accusing non-naturalists of having a theo-
ry-induced blindness that has led them to become dogmatically-narrow-mind-
ed-about-non-naturalism.24 Maybe it is doable, but it is a high hurdle to jump.
It is worth emphasizing that, even if the original charge were to succeed for 
every actual error theorist, the issue raised here still emerges. The point of Kyri-
acou’s vice-charge was to explain the error theorist’s alleged intellectual miscon-
duct. If such misconduct can in principle occur without this vice, as it evidently 
can, then some other explanation—whether a narrower vice-charge or some-
thing else entirely—will be needed to supplement or refine the original charge. 
4. Conclusion
I do not wish to rule out the possibility that such explanations could be given, 
but they would have to survive the sort of reasoning outlined above, at least if we 
wish to make the charge in question robust enough for it to be able to vindicate 
the MFP view. There are major difficulties with identifying a relevant vice-charge 
that can (a) be made robust and (b) play the dialectical role needed to support 
the MFP view. So, without a robust charge the MFP view remains in trouble, for 
its prima facie implausible commitment—that error theorists are conceptually 
(or meta-conceptually) deficient—has yet to be made plausible. Until plausible 
diagnoses of this intellectual misconduct can be given, we must reject this com-
mitment, and the MFP view with it.25
University of Manchester
stephen.ingram@manchester.ac.uk
23 Cf. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
24 Kidd, “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice,” 184.
25 For comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Jimmy Lenman and Ian Kidd. I am also grate-
ful to Lizzy Kirkham, Denise Fox, and Shirley Carter.
 Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious? 89
References
Cassam, Quassim. “Vice Epistemology.” The Monist 99, no. 2 (April 2016): 159–
80.
Cuneo, Terence, and Russ Shafer-Landau. “The Moral Fixed Points: New Direc-
tions for Moral Nonnaturalism.” Philosophical Studies 171, no. 3 (December 
2014): 399–443.
Doris, John M. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behaviour. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Evers, Daan, and Bart Streumer. “Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual 
Truths?” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (March 2016). 
Ingram, Stephen. “The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau.” 
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (February 2015).
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Gir-
oux, 2011. 
Kidd, Ian James. “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice.” The Monist 99, no. 2 
(April 2016) 181–97.
Kyriacou, Christos. “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to 
Ingram.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (March 2017).
Mackie, J. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin, 1977.
Olson, Jonas. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014.
Zagzebski, Linda T. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and 
the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996.
